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Banking on Democracy: 
The Political Economy of International 
Private Bank Lending in Emerging Markets
Javier Rodríguez and Javier Santiso
Abstract. Clearly, a new agenda is emerging for private international 
banks. Political issues such as human rights seem to be a current 
concern. But what about democracy? What about political regimes? Are 
they taken into account by private banks when they decide whether to 
invest in a country? Put another way, do private banks have democratic 
political preferences? In this article, we focus on cross-border lending 
from international bank(er)s. The questions asked are as follows. Do 
bank(er)s react positively (that is by increasing their lending) when an 
emerging democracy appears? Do we witness increased bank lending after 
democratic transitions? Lastly, is there any relation between democratic 
consolidation and bank lending?
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Introduction
Wall Street and the City are starting to take a fresh look at emerging markets. 
During the 1990s, fi nancial and economic variables dominated their analysis. 
In the 2000s, political, social, and ethical variables are becoming increasingly 
relevant.
Examples of this interest abound. Pension funds such as Calpers (a major US 
pension fund with more than US$230 billion in assets under its management 
in 2007 and which started to invest in emerging markets by the beginning of 
the 2000s) are considering, when investing in emerging markets, nonfi nancial 
criteria such as political stability, transparency, and labor rights (along with four 
other more traditional fi nancial criteria). One of the effects of this approach has 
been an improvement in ratings, with the scores of the 27 countries included in 
Calpers’ fi nancial screening improving overall. Among them, Morocco, Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, and Jordan, all of which were excluded from the list of countries suitable 
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for investment in 2002, topped the list for country improvements in 2003. When 
excluded from foreign investment, emerging-market countries tend to improve 
their governance practices and standards in order to attract investment (Hebb 
and Wojcik, 2004).
Meanwhile, as in the case of asset managers, bankers also started to take into 
account other variables to assess their investment decisions around the world. 
In 2003, a leading group of global bankers launched the Equator Principles, 
an unprecedented initiative led by 10 of the world’s largest banks to address the 
social and environmental impacts of the projects that they fi nance.1 Since then, 
all the big names in project fi nance (41 in total by mid-2007) have signed up 
for this series of guidelines (based on those used by the International Finance 
Corporation, the World Bank’s private fi nancing arm) for assessing their project 
fi nance deals. Banks with such impeccably capitalist credentials as Citibank, 
BBVA, ABN Amro, and HSBC are all lining up to prove that their operations can 
measure up to sustainability goals. In 2006, a revised set of guidelines (Equator II) 
was approved, expanding requirements for labor conditions, community health, 
and safety and security.
Human rights issues, which in the past have mainly been a focus of industrial 
companies (Colonomos and Santiso, 2005), have also been increasingly scrutinized 
by the fi nancial sector.2 Because the banking sector is increasingly coming under 
scrutiny from nongovernmental organizations for its role in fi nancial projects that 
might involve human rights issues, banks can no longer afford to be perceived 
to be complicit in ethical, social, and environmental abuses of their customers. 
Institutional investors, particularly those involved in active management and 
socially responsible funds, are asking more questions about political governance 
and human rights, with both issues being included in the agendas of bankers. 
Litigation risks have also been rising, as exemplifi ed by claims for more than 
US$100 billion faced in the USA in 2003 by more than 30 of the world’s leading 
international banks and corporations for their role in supporting apartheid in 
South Africa. Over past years, the US lawyer Ed Flagan has also became famous 
for suing Swiss banks on behalf of Holocaust survivors.
All in all, we have been witnessing a proliferation of initiatives. These include the 
160 fi nancial institutions that are part of the UN Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative (UNEP FI),3 the 120 companies that developed specifi c statements on 
human rights (among them asset managers such as Aberdeen Asset Management, 
insurers such as AGF, and banks such as Barclays, Standard Chartered, and Citi-
group), the 2300 business fi nance and noncommercial participants in the UN 
Global Compact, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and many more.
At the same time, one after another, foreign banks are rushing toward China. 
Lured by the huge market size of China’s agglomeration economy, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has been running as high as US$60 billion a year during the 
2000s, bank(er)s being part of this rush toward the Chinese gold mine. Most 
mergers and acquisitions by foreigners have involved buying minority stakes in 
state fi rms, mainly China’s banks. So far, China has collected more than US$20 bil-
lion for stakes in banks, investment boutiques, and fund management companies.4 
By mid-2007, a total of 74 foreign banks had branch operations and a further 186 
had representative offi ces in China. All in all, foreign banks still represent a meager 
2 percent of the Chinese market share (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007).
213-244 IPS_085613.indd   214 1/4/2008   11:45:35 AM
Process Black
 Santiso & Rodriguez: Banking on Democracy 215
Clearly, a new agenda is emerging for private international banks. Political issues 
such as human rights seem to be a current concern. But what about democracy? 
What about political regimes? Are they taken into account by private banks when 
they decide whether to invest in a country? Put another way, do private banks 
have democratic political preferences? The Chinese rush might suggest a mixed 
answer. However, as we want to underline, it seems that bank(er)s tend to love 
democracies more than initially suspected, and particularly emerging ones.
Private capital movements have been on the rise over the past few decades 
and bank fl ows have been part of this story. Such capital movements have been 
considered both as a panacea and an anathema by academics and policymakers. 
Some empirical studies have been devoted to analyzing the political drivers of 
this international liquidity, but paradoxically, very few have been devoted to the 
political economy of banking. Hardly any research exists on the role of politics 
in explaining cross-border banking movements. In particular, the democratic 
preferences of bank(er)s are under-researched. We need to know more about 
bank(er)s’ political preferences and the potential impact they can exert on both 
economic and political development.
A separate study is devoted to foreign direct investors, addressing the same 
question concerning political preferences (Neut and Santiso, 2008), and we 
have also dedicated another separate study to the political economy of portfolio 
investors (Nieto and Santiso, 2008), covering therefore the three major types of 
private capital fl ows: bank fl ows, FDI fl ows, and portfolio fl ows. In this article, we 
will focus only on a specifi c set of private fl ows: cross-border lending from inter-
national bank(er)s.5 The questions raised will also be narrower: do bank(er)s 
react positively (that is by increasing their lending) when an emerging democracy 
appears? Do we witness increased bank lending after democratic transitions? Lastly, 
is there any relation between democratic consolidation and bank lending?
The question is not therefore whether private bank(er)s prefer democracies 
worldwide, but whether they contribute to political development by lending to 
emerging democracies. The democratic preference of bank(er)s is in fact quickly 
assessed if we analyze banks’ cross-border claims. By the end of 2005, the stock 
of cross-border claims of Bank for International Settlements-reporting banks 
was US$21,450 billion. Of this total, the bulk was directed to developed, OECD 
economies, all of them democracies. Only US$2396 billion went to emerging 
countries, therefore roughly less than 11 percent of the total goes to emerging-
market economies, mostly to emerging democracies such as South Korea, Brazil, 
and Mexico. A country like China only concentrates a stock of US$114.6 billion 
in cross-border bank claims, which is less than 0.53 percent of the world stock. 
Bank(er)s therefore seem to have a clear preference for concentrating their 
lending activities (by more than 99 percent) toward democracies.6
It is therefore more interesting to look at whether bank(er)s tend to prefer to 
lend to new emerging democracies. In other words, do they react to democratic 
transitions and are they sensitive, once the transition is achieved, to democratic 
consolidation? These questions are interesting from a theoretical point of view as 
a body of research has been devoted to the contribution of banking to economic 
development, but not to political development.
In the present article, we use a newly compiled set of indicators on democracy, 
political stability, and policy, certainty linking these datasets with those for inter-
national bank fl ows developed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
213-244 IPS_085613.indd   215 1/4/2008   11:45:35 AM
Process Black
216 International Political Science Review 29(2) 
This provides therefore an empirical investigation of the political economy of 
cross-border bank fl ows in emerging markets, contributing to the rapidly growing 
body of literature on the determinants of international private capital fl ows and 
the overall analysis of the political preferences of bankers regarding the issue 
of democracy.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on the issue and 
develop a theoretical argument on why bank(er)s should prefer emerging 
democracies. Second, we underline the hypothesis and arguments regarding 
the potential preference of bank(er)s for emerging democracies. Subsequently, 
we focus on the empirical evidence concerning the political economy of bank 
fl ows in emerging markets in order to gauge if bankers have a political regime 
preference. We specifi cally discuss banking activity in Latin American countries 
(a region where democratic transitions have been very dense over past decades) 
and rival political hypotheses, such as the infl uence of policy instability. All in 
all, “banking on democracy” underlines the importance of bank(er)s not only 
in economic, but also in political development.7
The Political Economy of Private Bank 
Flows Toward Emerging Markets: A Review
Over the past few decades, private capital fl ows toward emerging economies have 
surged, far surpassing public, offi cial fl ows. OECD-based banks invested in and 
acquired major banks in developing countries, boosting the share of foreign 
bank credit in total domestic credit, which jumped from less than 6 percent in 
South America, for example, to nearly 40 percent in 2005. US and Spanish banks 
have been the most active in developing countries among OECD-based fi nancial 
institutions: between 1990 and 2003 they invested, respectively, US$74 billion 
and US$68 billion in developing countries, far ahead of UK (US$38 billion), 
German (US$34 billion), or French (US$32 billion) banks (Goldberg, 2007).
The paradox is that, until recently, little empirical research has been devoted 
to analyzing what have been the drivers of this global private liquidity (Levy-
Yeyati et al., 2003; Obstfeld, 1998; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004; Santiso, 2003). 
This is true, in particular, of private international bank activity around the world 
(Sapienza, 2004). Even if we have surveys and empirical studies that examine the 
factors behind international banks’ decisions to establish operations overseas, 
in particular in developing countries (Arena et al., 2006; Buch, 2003; Cerutti et al., 
2007; Galindo et al., 2003; Levy-Yeyati and Micco, 2007; Moreno and Villar, 2006; 
Wezel, 2004), and on the economic determinants of cross-border claims (Buch 
and Lipponer, 2007), we lack studies focusing on the role of political variables 
and institutions that might explain private, cross-border bank movements.
Much more research has been devoted to the economic impact of private bank 
fl ows around the world. Recent empirical studies, for example, have emphasized 
that banking liquidity has a positive effect on economic growth. Other studies 
have highlighted that capital infl ows are not risk-free assets and that, in particular, 
there is a strong relation between the volume of capital (bank fl ows included) 
and some recent fi nancial crises characterized by sudden crashes and highly 
dollarized economies (Calvo et al., 2004; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2005; 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003).
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We know, however, that the institutional and political environment can strongly 
infl uence international capital transactions. There is growing interest by scholars 
regarding how strongly law and politics are key drivers of international private 
capital fl ows (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) and fi nancial crises (Martínez and 
Santiso, 2003; Santiso, 2006; Stein and Streb, 2004; Whitehead, 2004). Both 
portfolio investments and foreign direct investments in emerging countries are 
sensitive to political variables (Neut and Santiso, 2008; Nieto and Santiso, 2008). 
Democratic transitions tend also to be followed by an increase in fi nancial develop-
ment (Huang, 2005).
The paradox of Lucas (1990) (that in theory capital should fl ow from rich to 
poor countries, but in practice we observe the reverse) has been explained as 
resulting from the quality (or lack of quality) of institutions. Empirical evidence 
for the period 1971–98, based on cross-country regressions using a sample of 50 
countries, shows that the most important variable in explaining the paradox is 
institutional quality, as measured by the extent to which secure property rights 
and non-corrupt governments shape international capital fl ows (Alfaro et al., 
2003). Good institutions and bad monetary policies are also important factors 
in explaining the high volatility of capital fl ows during this period (Alfaro et al., 
2005). The quality of legal systems has a strong impact on fi nancial development 
(Djankov et al., 2003; Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000a, 2000b), and particularly on merger 
and acquisition activity (Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and project fi nance deals (Esty 
and Megginson, 2003).
Regarding FDI capital fl ows, empirical evidence suggests that political variables 
are important and that multinational fi rms prefer to invest in democracies 
(Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Jensen, 2003, 2006a, 2006b; Rodrik, 1996). In sharp 
contrast with offi cial capital fl ows (offi cial development assistance by western 
governments), which registered negative net fl ows to newly democratic regimes in 
the three years after transition, FDI private investors have signifi cantly increased 
their investments in the three years following the shift to democratic rule in 23 
countries since the mid-1970s (Pei and Lyon, 2003).
As regards the more direct impact on banking dynamics, politics also matter. 
Governments are not disinterested parties in fi nancial systems. We know that the 
decision to privatize banks is highly political (Clarke et al., 2004) and that, in 
emerging economies, bank ownership (public versus private) matters for their 
performance – in other words, politics interfere in banking performance (Micco 
et al., 2005). In another recent empirical analysis, using quarterly data on 
gross, bilateral, private banking transactions from 19 “source” to 51 “recipient” 
countries from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s, it was highlighted that politics 
and institutions are key determinants of international private banking activities 
(Papaioannou, 2006). This research, including not only interbank loans, but 
also signifi cant amounts of portfolio and foreign direct fl ows related to bank 
activity, shows that a fall of 5 percent in the political risk of the recipient country 
is accompanied by a 2 percent rise in the volume of bilateral bank lending. The 
results are quite impressive as they show that all forms of risk identifi ed in previous 
studies, such as “economic,” “fi nancial,” and “political” risk (Erb et al., 1996), 
are signifi cant. But the most important of the three in explaining the drivers of 
foreign bank capital movements is “political risk” (Busse and Hefeker, 2007).
Other studies have emphasized that legal systems can explain the specifi c formats 
of international bank contracts. Government ownership of banks around the world 
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is associated with weak growth rates, weaker protection of property rights, lower 
productivity, weaker bank performance, and low levels of fi nancial development 
(La Porta et al., 2002). As suggested by García-Herrero and Martínez-Peria 
(2007), the claims of US, Spanish, and Italian banks in 90 countries tend to be 
sensitive to transaction costs (that is informational costs), but also to the role of 
government intervention in the fi nancial sector as well as country risk, which 
includes not only economic and fi nancial variables, but also political factors. 
These results are in line with other studies that have emphasized economic and 
political determinants of foreign banking activity (Martínez-Peria et al., 2005).
As highlighted by these studies, foreign banks seem to be particularly con-
cerned with political risk factors when considering investing and lending abroad. 
They tend to invest in countries with high-quality institutions and allocate credit to 
countries that are not characterized by corruption and which have effi cient legal 
systems. The results found imply that improving the effi ciency of bureaucracies 
in recipient countries, tackling the issue of corruption, and enhancing legal 
systems, particularly fi nancial ones, are crucial in attracting foreign banks. The 
question of the political regime preference remains, however, untouched by most 
of these studies. Do international private bank(er)s have a democratic preference 
when considering their activity in emerging markets? More specifi cally, do they 
increase or decrease their bank lending after democratic transitions? Why do 
they do so?
Bank(er)s are not a homogenous category and their activities worldwide are 
quite diverse. Here we consider only private banks, and not multilateral develop-
ment banks, which deserve a separate analysis.8 The BIS international banking 
database that we use only tracks private bank lending, not multilateral bank 
lending. We therefore limit the analysis here to private bank(er)s, focusing on a 
specifi c set of their activities (that is lending fl ows) for which there is a large and 
complete dataset available through the BIS. Banks are, in fact, very large entities 
and their activities range from bank lending to portfolio investments, through, 
for example, their fund management subsidiaries. Some are also involved in 
remittances business or insurance activities.
The present article focuses therefore on the lending activity of private inter-
national banks. It builds on the concepts and dataset developed by the Bank for 
International Settlements, focusing on BIS-reporting banks’ cross-border activity. 
This institution monitors the foreign claims held by mostly OECD countries 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world. It is the most comprehensive data monitoring of 
international banking activity. Claims defi ned by the BIS are those extended 
by international banks to residents outside the country in which the banks are 
headquartered. Foreign claims may cover fi nancial assets such as loans, debt 
securities, and equities, including equity participation in subsidiaries. The BIS 
data allows one to study stocks or fl ows and claims or liabilities, and to differentiate 
by country (not, however, by public and private borrowers in a specifi c country). 
We centered the analysis on fl ows, that is on new claims rather than stocks, in 
order to test if international private banks tend to react positively or negatively 
to a democratic transition and, once democracy is achieved, if they tend to in-
crease or decrease their lending activity with the consolidation of democracy. 
This question is particularly important as it will enable us to evaluate the political 
development contribution of banks: they are known to be key actors in economic 
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development in emerging countries (as well as developed countries), but do they 
also contribute to the political development of emerging countries?
This question is even more relevant if we consider recent political and historical 
trends. Between 1980 and 2005 more than 80 countries took signifi cant steps 
toward democracy, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe. For that 
reason, because we want to test if there is a democratic transition or consolidation 
effect on private bank lending, we pay special attention to Latin American and 
Eastern European countries where most of the democratic transitions have taken 
place over past decades.
In the case of Latin America, the number of countries that function as democracies 
(defi ned as regimes in which a government comes to and remains in power as the 
result of contested elections) peaked at more than 80 percent in 1989, and has 
remained at that level ever since. Regarding democracy, we also take into account 
the gray area that Guillermo O’Donnell (1992) labeled “delegative democracy,” 
that is “democracies neither consolidated nor unconsolidated.” Eastern European 
countries also experienced a massive shift in their political regimes, all of them 
becoming emerging democracies over the past two decades. Over the same per-
iod, private capital fl ows toward emerging markets skyrocketed. This is true in 
particular of private international banks, which have poured large amounts of 
money into emerging markets through their lending operations.
Bank(er)s’ Preference for Emerging Democracies: 
Hypothesis and Arguments
Why, however, would bank(er)s prefer emerging democracies? In other words, 
why would emerging democracies be good business for bank(er)s? We examine 
this question from the point of view of key policies for bankers, such as fi scal policy, 
monetary policy, and trade policy. We also take into account, more generally, 
other variables that have been identifi ed as key drivers of banking activity and 
entry into countries, such as privatization and growth, and we have centered our 
attention on young democracies.
Let us look fi rst at key policies such as fi scal, monetary, and trade policies. 
Empirical research on the relationship between democracy and fi scal policy is 
complex. Democratically elected politicians are supposed to be prone to seeking 
to minimize taxation and maximize spending, leading to an increase in budget 
defi cits. Some studies fi nd no signifi cant relationship between countries’ level 
of democracy and their average spending on social security and education 
(Mulligan et al., 2004). Other studies (Converse and Kapstein, 2006; Keefer, 2005; 
Tavaré and Wacziarg, 2001) tend, however, to indicate that young democracies 
exhibit initial increases in public spending with current expenditure picking up 
in particular in election years (while it is followed later by a long-term decline). 
Brender and Drazen (2005) fi nd also that political budget cycles are strongly (and 
only) present in newly democratized countries. In a sample of 68 democracies 
from 1960 to 2001, the traces of a political budget cycle are particularly present 
in the fi rst four elections following democratization. In other words, fi nancial 
needs from emerging democracies tend to increase in the very fi rst years of their 
existence, leading them to boost their borrowing activity and to become potentially 
good clients of international bank(er)s.
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Let us turn to monetary policy. Given its importance to the economic well-being 
of banks, it is also interesting to question whether young democracies also present a 
specifi c pattern in this regard. Several studies underline that democratic institutions 
tend to enhance the quality of monetary policymaking. Young democracies tend 
to perform quite impressively in terms of infl ation: from an average of 125 percent 
in the year of the democratic transition, consumer prices reach levels of around 
50 percent, on average, in four years. This pattern is not, however, uniform among 
regions (Converse and Kapstein, 2006). In Latin America, where hyperinfl ation 
processes have been very damaging, levels of infl ation, while reduced, have been 
left very high four years after the democratic transition: on average they reach 
levels of 390 percent in the year of the transition and 123 percent four years later, 
which is still a high and damaging level for bank(er)s. That said, if we only focus 
on the major recipients of bank lending, in other words the major countries of 
the region, we come back to the more general trend. In countries such as Mexico, 
Brazil, and Argentina, the reductions of levels of infl ation have been dramatic 
in the years following democratic transition and above all after democratic 
consolidations, helping to set a friendly market environment for bank(er)s.
Trade policy is also another channel leading to more banking activity, and par-
ticularly to increased lending operations through trade fi nance deals and export 
credit operations. Several studies corroborate that democracies tend to increase 
trade openness, Milner and Kubota (2005) showing, for example, that higher levels 
of democracy are associated with more liberal trade regimes, this being particu-
larly true in newer developing-world democracies. These fi ndings are also consistent 
with other studies showing that a greater degree of democracy is signifi cantly 
associated with a greater trade-to-GDP ratio. Converse and Kapstein (2006) also 
underlined in their 114 cases of democratization between 1960 and 2003 that 
trade ratios in terms of GDP tend to increase by nearly 10 points in the three 
years following a democratic transition, jumping from an average of 59 percent 
of GDP in the year of transition to 69 percent of GDP three years later.9
In terms of privatization, young democracies tend to favor increasing banking 
activity. Privatization operations are highly attractive for banks, implying high fees 
for those involved as advisers and also, in terms of credit, lucrative lending operations 
in order to fi nance the takeovers by private operators. Several empirical studies 
document that democracy is substantially and signifi cantly associated with the 
extent of privatization.10 Democracies privatize more than non-democracies and 
young democracies engage in heavy privatization programs in order to cash in 
resources to meet increasing social demands. Privatization programs have been 
particularly intensive in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Latin America, for 
example, accounted for 55 percent of total privatization revenues in the develop-
ing world in the 1990s, the proceeds reaching nearly US$180,000 billion (Chong 
and López de Silanes, 2004).
All policies examined (mainly fi scal and trade) tended to support greater bank 
lending activity in emerging democracies. The results are more mixed for mon-
etary policies. Young democracies also tend to grow at higher rates in the fi rst 
years following their transition, as shown by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), who 
underlined, with an extensive empirical sample of 154 countries, that the fi rst 
fi ve years following democratic transition are signifi cantly associated with higher 
economic growth and with lower variance in growth rates.
From the point of view of economic growth, however, the answer might not be 
as clear as it appears at fi rst sight. Some scholars have questioned “development” 
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theories, arguing that democracy has a slight, questionable, and statistically 
insignifi cant effect on economic growth (Przeworski et al., 2000).11 The literature 
is also divided regarding the effects of democratic transition on economic develop-
ment (Boix, 2003; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Przeworski, 2004b). Interestingly, Feng 
(2003) shows that the effect of democracy on growth is statistically insignifi cant, 
but he also fi nds that the degree of political democracy has a signifi cant impact 
on private investment: a reduction in political instability and policy uncertainty 
has a positive impact on the economy.
Others have established a strong link between democracy and growth and 
between the quality of institutions and long-term growth (Persson, 2004; Persson 
and Tabellini, 2003, 2005; Rigobón and Rodrik, 2005). Moreover, growth under 
democracy appears to be more stable than under authoritarian regimes. Dani 
Rodrik and Romain Wacziarg’s (2005) research also reveals that major democratic 
transitions had positive effects on economic growth in the short run and tend to 
be associated with a decline in growth volatility. Papaioannou and Siourounis 
arrive at a similar conclusion by analyzing the evolution of GDP growth before 
and after permanent democratization in the period 1960–2000. According to 
their estimates, democratization, on average, leads to an approximate increase 
of 0.7–1.0 percent in real per capita growth. Democratization is associated not 
only with higher growth, but also less volatile rates of growth (Papaioannou and 
Siourounis, 2005), confi rming previous fi ndings that democratic societies experi-
ence less volatile growth rates (Rodrik, 1997, 1999). Democratization has the 
strongest impact on growth volatility in highly unstable countries such as those 
in Latin America.
Decisive research, underlining that democratizations induce accelerations of 
growth (and are therefore good for banking business), has also been conducted 
by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2004). Drawing on previous and com-
plementary research and considering different forms of democracy, they show 
empirically that becoming a democracy accelerates growth by 0.75 percentage 
points (Persson, 2004; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). The fi ndings are based on 
a large sample of about 150 countries, include 120 regime changes over the 
period 1960–2000, and are consistent with previous studies (Papaioannou and 
Siourounis, 2004). An interesting result achieved by Persson and Tabellini is 
that new presidential democracies grow on average 1.5 percentage points more 
than new parliamentary democracies. This is particularly interesting for Latin 
American countries, where presidential regimes dominate. In a later work, they 
also fi nd an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy in the order 
of –2 percentage points (Persson and Tabellini, 2007).
There are therefore strong economic arguments, already tested empirically, that 
would help to explain a potential political preference for emerging democracies 
by bank(er)s. The empirical test of this preference remains, however, an open 
question. Is there empirical evidence to support a positive answer to the question: 
do bank(er)s tend to prefer emerging democracies?
Bank(er)s and Emerging Democracies
Proximity and cultural factors seem to be some of the variables behind trends 
in bank fl ows (Rodríguez and Santiso, 2007b). GDP, population, surface area in 
square kilometers, interest rates, and even the level of corruption of the country in 
question are some of the other key drivers of bank fl ows (Papaioannou, 2006). 
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This section, and the article as a whole, does not focus on these variables, but on 
determining if political factors make some difference in the granting of inter-
national bank fi nancing. In order to do so, we have studied different variables, 
such as the democratic transition year, the level of democratization of an emerging 
economy, the stability of economic policy, the political stability of ministries, and 
the differences between different presidencies in different emerging countries.
As highlighted by many researchers, a number of different methodological 
issues are raised when we consider the analysis of democratization and private 
bank fl ows. The availability of data is one issue, as well as the measures used to 
gather data. Most of the datasets present weaknesses with respect to the availabil-
ity of items, but more importantly, the hypothesis, concepts, and defi nitions 
behind each dataset are open to question. One important issue regards causality. 
In simple terms, private bank money may fl ow toward emerging democracies 
mostly because economic windows of opportunity such as privatizations have 
suddenly opened. Banks rush toward emerging democracies not because they 
are democracies, but because they are emerging economies that have privatized 
their banking assets.
It happens to be the case that democracies (at least in Latin America) had 
during the last decades of the 20th century a strong propensity to privatize. 
Democracies tend to prefer to privatize assets fully while autocracies tend to 
maintain control over their economies. In the end, as highlighted by Giavazzi 
and Tabellini (2004), political and economic liberalization have been closely 
connected. Economic and political liberalization feed off each other, so that it 
is diffi cult to tell in which direction the causality runs. Analysis of the timing of 
different events tends, however, to indicate that the causality is more likely to run 
from political to economic reforms. Democratization appears to lead to economic 
liberalization, with the extent of economic liberalization gradually increasing in 
the years following the transition to democracy. This would suggest that political 
liberalization induces economic liberalization to a far greater extent than the 
other way around. This is true in particular for Latin American countries, where 
in most cases political liberalization took place before bank privatization.
As a fi rst approach to the question of whether bankers prefer democracy 
in emerging markets, we analyzed the correlation between the BIS data series 
and other political databases, using the standard classifi cation of democracy of 
Przeworski et al. (2000).12 We have chosen two series that indicate the level of 
democratization of an economy. The fi rst indicator is called “Consolidation of 
Democracy” and was formulated by Schmitter and Schneider (2004) (used for the 
series of graphs shown in Figure 1 below). This indicator measures the extent to 
which democracy consolidates itself in a country. We have used the yearly fi gures 
for a series of countries. The greater the value of the consolidation indicator, the 
stronger democracy is rooted in the country. The second indicator is one that 
is more commonly used in the economic literature, namely the “Democracy 
Score” formulated by Polity IV (used for the series of graphs shown in Figure 2 
below). This indicator is a measure of the existing level of democracy of a given 
country. We have also used an annual series here, but in this case the value of 
the indicator ranges from zero to 10 (proximity to 10 means a greater level of 
democratization, and vice versa). Both series of indicators are used in order 
to check the accuracy of our results with two different measures of democratic 
transition and consolidation.
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We have also made use of the years in which democratic transition has taken 
place over the past few decades in different countries in order to gauge whether 
banking fl ows increased after transition. The fi gures were obtained using empirical 
research developed by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) and Carrillo et al. (2003), 
as well as the Przeworski et al. (2000) series. In line with Persson (2004), Persson 
and Tabellini (2003), and a large body of literature on the topic, we defi ne a 
country as a democracy if it has strictly positive values for the POLITY2 indicator 
in the Polity IV database. In line with Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004), we refer to 
democratization as an event in which a country becomes a democracy when this 
was not the case in the previous year. We have verifi ed and cross-checked the 
Giavazzi and Tabellini timing with the one developed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) in 2004 for Latin America and the overall one 
developed by Przeworski et al. (2000).
(fi gure 1 continued)
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(fi gure 1 continued)
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(fi gure 1 continued)
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The graphical analysis of foreign claims by country, in combination with 
the democracy indicators, shows a common pattern for countries and indicators. 
Bank lending tends to increase after a democratic transition. An increase in the 
democracy indicators has a positive impact on the entry of private foreign claims, 
although in some countries there is a lag of two or three years. The graphs in 
Figure 1 show the relationship between the two series. Because of lack of space 
we only reproduce the Latin American examples, where the pattern is particularly 
relevant. Latin America is one of the regions in the world that has experienced 
the most impressive democratic transitions over the past decade, along with 
Eastern Europe (where the relation also looks strong13). In addition, in some cases 
a vertical line has been added in order to show the year in which the transition 
took place in the country in question.
Next, we take those countries for which we have data available and which have 
undergone a democratic transition (mostly Latin American and Eastern European 
countries). We examine how the democratic transition affects the country’s private 
bank infl ows. Taking the year of transition as t = 0 for all countries, we observe 
the growth rate of banking fl ows before and after the transition in each country. 
The results are striking.
Before democratic transition, the annual growth of fl ows in the three previous 
years has a mean equal to 1.04 percent (at a global level). After transition, the entry 
of banking fl ows in the following three years accelerates, growing at an average 
of 4.37 percent. For Latin American countries alone, the study concludes that in 
the three years prior to transition the annual average growth rate was negative, 
at –1.53 percent, and stood at 4.28 percent for the three years after democratic 
transition. Clearly, at least in Latin America, bankers tend to love new, emerging 
democracies, increasing their lending to this type of borrower. A transition toward 
democracy tends to favor foreign bank infl ows. The other side of this coin is 
fi gure 1. Foreign Claims (millions USD) and Consolidation of Democracy Indicator
Source: Authors, 2007; based on BIS, for private bank fl ows; Schmitter and Schneider (2004), Giavazzi 
and Tabellini (2004), IADB (2004) and Przeworski et al. (2000) for political indicators.
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(fi gure 2 continued)
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(fi gure 2 continued)
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fi gure 2. Foreign Claims (millions USD) and Democracy Score Indicator (Latin America) 
Source: Authors, 2007; based on BIS; Schmitter and Schneider (2004), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004), 
IADB (2004) and  Przeworski et al. (2000).
that emerging borrowers seem to have had easier access to foreign, private bank 
lending once they became democracies.
Banks and Policy Instability in Emerging Democracies
Bankers tend, therefore, to prefer lending to emerging democracies and their 
lending consolidates as democracy also consolidates. In this section, we shift 
the focus of our analysis away from political regimes to policy stability in order to 
gauge whether bankers prefer policy stability. In other words, we want to test if 
the above-mentioned democratic preference does not mask a preference for 
political stability.
The common and generalized perception is that bankers tend to be averse to 
risk and that they avoid politically unstable countries for generally good reasons, 
since instability has a negative impact on the economy of a country, particularly on 
growth, debt levels, fi scal defi cits, and on infl ation rates. As previously indicated, 
in their core decision-making process on political risk, banks tend to be put off 
by political instability in general, as this increases policy instability, which in turn 
impacts negatively on growth and discourages private investment. However, they do 
not seem sensitive to all kinds of instability. In particular, they tend to be somewhat 
neutral to democratic political instability. In spite of democratic political instability, 
they have continued to invest in Latin America’s emerging democracies.
Latin America is known to be one of the most politically unstable areas in the 
world. Between 1945 and 2000 there were around 160 occurrences of regime 
transition, that is shifts from non-democracies toward democracies and vice versa. 
While Latin America accounts for less than 10 percent of the countries in the world, 
it accounted for more than 35 percent of regimes undergoing transition over that 
period. In other words, Latin American countries experienced on average three 
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regime transitions during that period, while South Asian countries, in comparison, 
had 1.4 transitions per country during the same period (Cheibub, 2003).
Latin American democracies have tended to stabilize over past decades. In 
order to capture policy instability, we constructed what we call an “Economic 
Policy Stability Index.” The index draws on the Fraser Institute’s 2006 Economic 
Freedom of the World Index (EFW Index). A graphical analysis of foreign claims 
by country, together with the Economic Policy Stability Index, shows a strong 
relationship between both series. The greater the stability of an economy, the 
higher the amount of foreign claim infl ows.14
Contrary to the case with regard to democracy, in which the “possible” effect 
on foreign claims was observed mainly after abrupt changes in the indicator (as in 
the case of transition), bank fl ows are more sensitive to political stability. That is 
to say, less abrupt changes in the index also have effects on fl ows. In continuation, 
(fi gure 3 continued)
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(fi gure 3 continued)
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(fi gure 3 continued)
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fi gure 3. Foreign Claims (millions USD) and Economic Policy Stability Index in Latin America 
Source: Authors, 2007; based on BIS and The Fraser Institute, 2006.
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correlations of the indicators of democracy and the Economic Policy Stability 
Index with respect to foreign claims are shown in Table 1. As has already been 
seen in the graphs above, in general terms the correlations are high with the 
stability index and lower with the democracy indicators (due to the effects on 
the series commented on in the previous paragraph). These have been made for 
each of the 30 countries included in the database for the period for which data is 
table 1. Correlations of Foreign Claims with Economic Policy Stability Index, Consolidation of 
Democracy Index and Democracy Score
Correlations
Foreign Claims vs 
EFW
1985–2004
Foreign Claims vs 
CoD
1984–2000
Foreign Claims vs DS
1984–2000
Russia 0.92 0.90 0.75
India 0.90 – –
Polonia 0.87 0.48 0.50
Peru 0.86 0.24 0.25
Brazil 0.85 0.46 0.22
Paraguay 0.80 – –
Turkey 0.80 0.86 0.10
Grecia 0.79 0.51 0.27
Romania 0.78 0.40 0.49
Hungary 0.76 0.54 0.34
Portugal 0.76 0.57 –
Slovenia 0.76 0.67 0.50
Czech Rep 0.74 0.71 0.52
China 0.73 – –
Venezuela 0.71 – 0.30
Ukraine 0.71 0.83 0.57
Morocco 0.71 0.88 –
Slovakia 0.70 0.64 0.66
Colombia 0.69 -0.73
Tunisia 0.69 –0.30 0.59
Chile 0.68 0.57 0.53
Mexico 0.66 0.70 0.83
Argentina 0.66 0.77 0.07
Guatemala 0.65 0.90 0.86
Spain 0.64 0.08 –
Uruguay 0.48 0.72 0.35
Bolivia 0.45 0.49 0.06
Bulgaria –0.01 –0.28 –0.08
Nicaragua –0.77 0.13 –0.24
Algeria –0.95 –0.47 –0.54
Note : EFW stands for Economic Freedom of The World (Fraser Institute data); CoD Consolidation of Democracy 
data (Schmitter and Schneider data); and DS Democracy Score (Polity IV data).
Source: BIS, The Fraser Institute, Schmitter and Schneider (2004), and Polity IV.
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available. Algeria presents an exceptional case in which not only is the result not 
confi rmed, but the greater the degree of economic policy stability, the smaller 
the amount of infl ows.
In order to complete the analysis of the banking preference for policy stab-
ility, we also analyze the possible relationship between bank lending and the 
stability of ministerial and gubernatorial offi ce. In other words, we tackle the 
question of whether bank fl ows are affected by political instability in emerging 
democracies.
We have seen previously that banks have tended to boost their activity in Latin 
America over past decades, increasing their lending after the return of democracy 
in spite of the long track record of political instability in the region. Political regime 
instability has almost disappeared since the third wave of democratization, in the 
sense that we have not witnessed any major democratic breakdown in the region. 
This is in contrast with the previously large number of coups d’état and other 
successful efforts to remove sitting governments through illegal and sometimes 
violent action (more than 70 in Latin America over the past half century alone 
and nearly one per year from the 1800s to the 1970s). However, this does not 
mean that political instability has disappeared. Regular events such as elections, 
cabinet reshuffl es, and political crises still remain. What impact, therefore, does 
democratic instability, that is political change within a democratic regime, have on 
bank fl ows?
We have measured democratic political instability in terms of cabinet turnover, 
that is changes in the composition of a cabinet within a government’s lifetime 
(Huber and Martínez-Gallardo, 2003). For a measure of democratic political 
instability, we used a dataset developed by Martínez-Gallardo which records all 
the changes in the composition of cabinets in seven Latin American countries 
between 1988 and 2000. Cabinet changes include both terminations, that is 
ministers who resign from their post in the cabinet and take up work elsewhere, 
and reshuffl es, whereby ministers are moved from one portfolio to another. All 
such changes take place, therefore, within the rules of the democratic game.
We would expect that changes in ministerial tenures should have some impact 
on bank fl ows, to the extent that these could affect the quality of democratic 
policymaking and the performance of governments. The results confi rm that 
ministerial cabinets are consistently more stable under situations of higher 
growth rates. They are more stable where the environment for law and order 
is more stable. Cabinet changes are, in one way or another, a political response 
to a shock. Ministers may be changed due to shifts in presidential strategy, opp-
osition pressure, or an exogenous shock such as a fi nancial crisis. After the 1994 
devaluation in Mexico, for example, President Zedillo replaced his minister of 
fi nance with another cabinet member in an (unsuccessful) effort to overcome 
the crisis (Santiso, 1999).
Bankers seem indifferent as to whether center, left-wing, or right-wing 
governments are in power and whether they have an absolute majority or operate 
in coalition with other parties. It is even more interesting to note that when we 
consider political instability as measured by cabinet turnover, bankers also seem 
to be indifferent. The correlations of foreign claims with ministerial stability 
and the average duration of ministers in offi ce are insignifi cant at 0.10 and 0.06, 
respectively. In other words, bank fl ows do not seem to be sensitive to ministerial 
turnover as measured by the amount of time ministers spend in offi ce.
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table 2. Foreign Claims and Ministers Stability in Latin America
Presidency 
Including months
Foreign 
Claims % of 
total Latam
Ministers 
Stability (% 
total)
Ministers 
average 
duration in 
months
Argentina Menem Jul-89/Apr-95 14.73 53.45 46
Menem 2 May-95/Nov-99 18.35 34.48 28
De la Rua Dec-99/Dec-01 17.34 31.03 22
Bolivia Zamora 1989/1993 0.12 32.50 27
de Lozada 1993/1997 0.16 32.50 33
Banzer 1997/2001 0.42 42.50 39
Brazil Collor Jan-90/92 29.52 21.88 29
Franco 92/Dec-94 28.83 42.71 44
Cardoso Jan-95/Dec-98 31.39 31.25 30
Cardoso 2 Jan-99/Dec-02 25.87 20.83 20
Chile Alwyn Dec-89/Dec-93 6.36 37.29 22
Frei Jan-94/Dec-99 8.63 55.93 41
Lagos Jan-00/,,, 9.03 23.73 16
Colombia Gaviria Jun-90/May-94 3.47 35.78 42
Samper Jun-94/May-98 4.60 45.87 59
Pastrana Jun-98/May-00 4.17 29.36 32
Ecuador Borja Aug-88/Jul-92 1.87 18.10 23
Duran Aug-92/Jul-96 1.25 28.45 38
Bucaram Aug-96/Jan-97 1.07 12.07 14
Alarcon Feb-97/Jul-98 0.98 16.38 19
Mahuad Aug-98/Jan-00 0.75 18.97 25
Noboa Feb-00/Dec-02 0.34 15.52 18
Mexico Salinas Jan-88/Dec-1993 27.27 41.98 40
Zedillo Jan-94/Dec-00 23.60 41.98 37
Fox Jan-01/Act 38.21 22.22 19
Paraguay Rodrigues 1954/1993 0.33 26.98 20
Wasmosy 199 3Mar-98 0.40 36.51 26
Cubas Grau Apr-98/Mar-99 0.34 17.46 11
González Macchi Apr-99/Aug-03 0.30 23.81 16
Peru Fujimori Apr-90/Mar-95 1.41 44.90 57
Fujimori 2 Apr-95/Mar-00 2.88 51.02 61
Paniagua Apr-00/Jul-01 2.97 13.27 14
Uruguay Lacalle Apr-90/Mar-95 1.52 53.70 36
Sanguinetti 2 Apr-95/Mar-00 1.58 38.89 23
Battle Apr-00/Act 1.09 25.93 15
Venezuela Perez Jan-89/May-93 9.66 36.92 60
Velazquez Jun-93/Jul-94 8.53 13.08 19
Caldera Aug-94/Dec-98 4.66 33.85 47
Chavez Jan-99/Jun-00 4.55 18.46 38
Chavez 2 Aug-00/Act 3.94 10.77 22
Source: based on BIS and Martínez-Gallardo (2004).
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In order to control all our results quantitatively, we carried out an econometric 
exercise to check the determinants of bank fl ows. There are several empirical 
studies that analyze the determinants of bank fl ows (for a survey, see Papaioannou, 
2006). Our purpose here is, however, more simple: to verify the previous fi ndings 
for political variables using another tool.
The analysis of the determinants of bank fl ows was made by means of an 
econometric analysis of panel data. We have a panel of annual data on 29 coun-
tries for the period 1984–2004. We use the following variables to explain the 
determinants of bank fl ows: GDP, population, human capital proxies, interest 
rates, a “Consolidation of Democracy” (CoD) indicator, a “Democracy Score” 
(DS) indicator, an “Economic Policy Stability” indicator, ministerial stability, and 
the composition of governments.
table 3. Foreign Claims Determinants
Foreign Claims (FC)
      
Log FC Log FC
Log_GDP 0.792 Log_FC (–1) 0.393
(0.078) (0.022)*
Log_Population 0.712 Log_GDP 0.307
((0.325) (0.067)
DS 0.034 Log_Population 0.855
(0.012) (0.265)
Constant –9.44 DS 0.03
(5.23) ((0.01)
Constant –11.46
(4.26)
R – sq 0.776 R – sq 0.844
Obs. 483 Obs. 463
Groups 26 Groups 26
Log FC Log FC
Log_GDP 0.372 Log_GDP 1.206
(0.089) (0.14)
Log_Population 1.123 Log_population 0.268
(0.495) (0.42)
CoD 0.035 EFW 0.103
(0.013) (0.045)
Constant –13.22 Constant –5.179
(7.99) (6.92)
R – sq 0.642 R – sq 0.561
Obs. 336 Obs. 206
Groups 24 Groups 27
Estimation by Fixed-effects.
Log_FC(–1) is a lag of one period of foreign claims.
*Signifi cance at the 5% level.
Sources: Authors, 2007; based on IMF, World Bank, The Fraser Institute, Polity IV, and Schmitter and 
Schneider.
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The results show how foreign claims, apart from depending on GDP and on the 
population of an economy, are positively correlated to the level of democratization 
in the recipient country. The results with respect to the democracy variable are 
confi rmed, fi rst, by using the CoD indicator and, second, with the DS indicator. 
The Economic Policy Stability indicator (using the EFW) also infl uences the in-
fl ows of fi nance to a country (the results are less trustworthy due to the fact that 
the EFW data are only available every fi ve years between 1985–2000, which means 
a smaller pool of information).
A country receives more fi nance when its gross domestic product increases, 
its population is higher, when more fi nance was received the previous year, and 
when it has higher levels of democratization and more economic policy stability. 
Here again, using this econometric verifi cation, ministerial stability and the 
composition of governments or banks do not appear to be determinant factors, 
nor do interest rates or human capital.
Conclusions
Bank(er)s seem, therefore, willing to increase their lending operations to newly 
emerging democracies. They also tend to prefer emerging democracies where 
policies are stable and seem indifferent to political instability as defi ned by min-
isterial turnover. In regions such as Latin America, where democratic transitions 
have multiplied over the past two decades, the preference for emerging democracies 
is particularly striking, as cross-border bank lending tends to rise in the years 
following the breakdown of authoritarianism.
From an economic point of view, as we have underlined, we can understand 
why international bank(er)s might be right in preferring emerging democracies. 
There are solid economic reasons to explain why bank(er)s prefer emerging 
democracies, with fi scal and monetary policies or institutional quality in emerging 
democracies being favorable to the banking business. However, we might highlight 
that the answer may lie not only in economic considerations, but also in ethical 
ones. Bank(er)s might be right to prefer lending to emerging democracies not 
only because it is good business, in economic terms, but also from the point of view 
of ethics. Lending to emerging democracies may be no more than a pledge of 
support by banks for “all things living” on their journey In Search of a Better World, 
as envisaged by the Anglo-Austrian philosopher Karl Popper in his collection of 
essays and lectures on the need for a new professional ethic. These conjectures 
are an invitation to further research.
In the same vein, we can also make another invitation for further analysis, this 
one based on methodological precision. BIS data includes banking claims and 
liabilities, that is information on lenders and borrowers. In this article, we have 
focused on lending activity rather than on borrowing activity (liabilities being the 
counterpart of claims, and refl ecting in the end the same kind of information). 
However, an interesting question is set aside because of a lack of data (the BIS 
dataset does not include disaggregated data on borrowers): in further research, 
using other datasets (probably country case studies), it would be interesting to 
test if bankers tend to differentiate between borrowers from non-democracies 
and borrowers from emerging democracies. This would allow us to deepen the 
question and test if bank(er)s differentiate between undemocratic governments 
and their subjects suffering from the lack of democracy when making credit 
decisions.
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Notes
 1. See http://www.equator-principles.com. For a critical monitoring of this initiative by 
a group of leading nongovernmental organizations, see BankTrack at http://www.
banktrack.org/.
 2. For a review, based on good practices and case studies, on how fi nancial services are 
affected by and manage the challenges associated with human rights, see F&C Asset 
Management and KPMG (2004).
 3. See http://www.unepfi .org.
 4. For a systematic study, see Leigh and Podpiera (2006).
 5. For a study of workers’ remittances and democracy, see Biglaiser (2006). For studies on 
bond markets and democracy, see Archer et al. (2007), Cho (2006), Maxfi eld (2000), 
Saiegh (2005), and Schultz and Weingast (2003).
 6. In terms of bank assets, the picture does not change, as bank assets vis-a-vis developed, 
OECD countries account for 37 percent of world GDP and bank assets vis-a-vis emerging 
economies less than 3 percent of world GDP.
 7. As noted by one of the referees, “banking on democracy” was fi rst used as the main 
title of an infl uential paper by John Freeman in the early 1990s. Freeman’s paper, 
however, dealt with a very different set of issues. It was mainly about the relationship 
between international fi nancial fl ows in general and political sovereignty. See Freeman 
(1990). We would like to thank the anonymous referee for this useful insight.
 8. For an extensive review, see, for example, Santiso (2004).
 9. López-Córdoba and Meissner (2005) found a positive relation between trade openness 
and democracy from 1895 onward. For a discussion, see also Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2005) and Rigobón and Rodrik (2005).
10. For a review and analysis, see Biglaiser and Danis (2002).
11. For a critical analysis of the new institutionalism literature, see Przewroski (2004a).
12. In line with Przeworski et al. (2000), regimes are classifi ed as democracies if during 
a particular year they satisfy simultaneously four criteria: (1) the chief executive 
is elected; (2) the legislature is elected; (3) more than one party competes in the 
elections; and (4) incumbent parties have in the past or will have in the future lost an 
election and yielded offi ce. All regimes that fail to satisfy at least one of these criteria 
are classifi ed as nondemocratic (Przeworski et al., 2000: 18–29). Hence the political 
regime classifi cation is simplifi ed and becomes a dichotomous variable that takes a 
value of zero if a country is a democracy and one if it is not, according to the four 
cumulative criteria.
13. This is shown in more detail in the working paper that helped to shape this article. 
See Rodríguez and Santiso (2007a).
14. For graphs relating to economic policy stability in non-Latin American countries, see 
Rodríguez and Santiso (2007a).
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